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No. 71-16
Mitchell et al v. Mandel

This case involves the validity of Section 212(a)(28) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the Mccarren Act),
which prescribes classes of aliens eligible to receive visas.
Mandel, a Belgium marxist, is in a prohibited class, but
the statute authorizes the Attorney General to admit an alien
"temporarily despite his inadmissibility".

-

Mandel sought a visa to lecture in the U.S.; the Secretary
of State recommended approval, but the Attorney General refused.
Mandel, together with several U.S. citizens, brought this
action to declare the statute unconstitutional as a violation
of the First Amendment rights of the U.S. citizens who wish to
hear Mandel.
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the three judge court held that the statute

violated First Amendment freedoms, the third judge dissenting.
Both opinions are elaborate and scholarly.

l

The Solicitor General's Jurisdictional Statement states that:
"This Court has repeatedly held that the
decision to exclude (aliens) and the grounds
for admissibility are not matters for judicial
inquiry."
Cases cited by the S.G. include:

Mishimura Ekiu v. U.S.,

142 U.S. 651, 659; Boutilier v. Immigration Service, 387 U.S. 118,
123; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (quoting Mr. Justice

2.

Frankfurter); United States v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537; and
United States v. Williams, 195 U.S. 279; see also Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S . 580.
The majority opinion of the three judge court takes the

"--------

-

position - if I understand it correctly - that the power to

c----

£xclude aliens is not absolute and is subject to judicial review.
The opinion draws a distinction between exclusion where the
alien advocates "violent revolution or subversion by revoluntionary
communism" (page 14A of S.G. 's brief), and the mere advocacy of
marxist philosophy.

The Court relies on Dennis v. United States,

341 U.S. 491, 508-512; Yeatts v. U. S., 354 U.S. 298, 324-325;
and several other cases.
It appears from the opinions - although not entirely clearly
that all of the cases relied on by the majority of the three
~

k

judge court involve U.S. citizens~ the deportation of aliens :~
already in the United States pursuant to valid entry.
If my preliminary reading of these opinions is correct,
this case presents a challenge to the established doctrine that
the power to exclude aliens is not subject to judicial review or
limited by the Bill of Rights.
Before making my final decision, I would like to know whether
the line of cases cited in the S.G. 's brief will, in effect, be
overruled if appellee's position is sustained?

3.
w

I would also like to know, if Mandel's position is sustained,
what limits - if any - would then exist on the right of each
American citizen

(claiming First Amendment protection) to

insist that a particular alien be admitted unless the Government
can prove that such alien (within the Dennis doctrine) will
advocate violent revolution or subversion by revoluntionary
communism?

*****
As a matter of policy, the statute in question seems to
me to be too broad and possibly lacking in appropriate standards.
My concern is whether (i) the judiciary, vindicating First Amendment rights of U. S. citizens, has the constitutional authority
to interfere with what should be a legislative and executive
responsibility; and (ii) whether if the court below is affirmed,
the effect will be to overrule a long line of Supreme Court
decisions.
It is also difficult for me to see, as a matter of
administration of the immigration laws, how any alien can be
excluded or denied a visa without the real risk of some friend
who is a U.S. citizen demanding judicial review.

A Hold for Nine Case
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Appeal from USDC for EDNY (3-Judge Court)(Feinberg, Circuit Judge,
~

Bartels & Dooling)(Bartels, USDJ, dissenting)
First Amendment; Exclusion of Aliens.

r·· . . .

Appellee Mandel is a citi:?en .and resident of Belgium.
~

He is

a member of the Communist Party, but he is an orthodox Marxist

of the the Trotskyist school.

He is editor-in-chief of the Belgian

Left Socialist Weekly, and the author of a two volume work entitled
Marxist Economic Theory.

He is an academic advocate of the

doctrine of Marxism, but the Govt does not contend that he has
at any time ever attempted to incite subversive action.

The appellees

other than Mandel are citizens of the US who had issued invitations
to Mandel in 1969 to participate in conferences and to speak at
universities and other forums in the

us.

Sectiom 212(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v) of the Immigration and Nationality
.

·-:::....

~

Abt o f ~ . 8 USC 1182(a)(28)(D) and (G)(v), provide thats
• • • the following classes of aliens shall be
ineligible to receive ~a~ and shall be excluded
from admission into the nited States 1

."..

..."
(28)

Aliens who are, or at any time have been,
members Q£ any of the following classes,

.,.
"

(D)

.,.
"

*

Aliens • • • who advocate the economic O international,
governmental doctrines of World communism or the
establishment in t fie United States of a totalitarian
dictatorship • • •

and

* *
(G)

,,

-1,

*

Aliens who write or publish • • • any • • •
matter • • • advocating or teaching, , • (v)
the economic, international, and governmental doctrines
of world communism , • , •

----

Pursuant to this statute, Mandel was and is ineligible for a
The statute has an exception, however, which

..•

provides in pertinent part:
• • • an Lineligibl~7 alien • • • may, after approval
by the Attorney General of a recommendation by the
Secretary of State • • • that the alien be admitted
temporarily despite his inadmissibility, }?e granted
Sl!Ch a visa and may be admitted into the United States
temporar1.ly as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of the
Attorney General • • • •

-

The Secretary of State recommended that Mandel be granted a

---------

nonimmigrant visa for the contemplated 6 day vist and lecture
~

---

-

tour, but the Attorney General refused to grant the requested

----

- that Mandel had been admitted
waiver and visa, despite the fact
into the US in 1962 and again in 1968 pursuant to recommendations
by the Secretary of State , a~d waivers by the ,. then Attorneys General,
Appellees then commenced this suit against the Sec. of State
and the AG, claiming that the statutory exclusion provisions are
unconstitutional, and that their application to Mandel was in

~

------

any event unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreasonable.

The Chief

Judge of CA 2 ordered a ~judge cou_;:__t convened in USDC for ED NYa
and ~he ~SDC held the political exclu_;ion provisions of the statute

--

unconstitutional

1!.§

/I

applied J;,Q Mandel, enjoined the Govt from

applying the political exclusion provisions to deny Mandel admission
;

,.

to the US as a nonimmigrant visitoro and ordered the appellants to ·
grant a nonimmigrant visa to Mandel.

Relief was limited to Mandel 0 s

case (the statute was declared unconstitutional as a plied, rather
than unc=stitutional :n--;ts face).

,

~~~I>-}~/~~~·

.i..;_ ~+- 0, - S'...eG~ .;_ , '2- lc.) (1-'i?) 7
The Govt did not base its refusal to grant the visa on any ~

claim that Mandel has subversive affiliations, that his presence

y.> 2--

'15 G-'

~_

in the US would endanger the national security, or that his exclusion is dictated by foreign policy considerationso

Indeed, ~

Govt did not identify apy governmental interest involved, giving no

---------

reason for excluding Mandel, but relying instead on the discretion of
the Attorney General.

The crux of the USOC's opinion is that appellees' 1st amend•
ment
rights have been infringed by the Govt in this case.
,,

Over the

last decade, this Court has noted that the 1st amendment "protects

-------- --

the right to_ receive informationj and ideas."
~

'

394 US 557, 564 (1969).

~

-

l/

Stanley y. Georgia,

..

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. y. FCC,

395 US 367, 389-90 (1969); Lamont y. Postmaster General, 381 US
301, 305-07 (1965).

The USOC followed these cases to conclude

that this case involves primarily the 1st amendment rights of
the American appellees, rather than any rights of appellee Mandel.
.....

-·--- --

-

Neither the Govt nor the dissent in the USDC takes the position

..._

that appellees' 1st amendment rights are not involved. The position
•
of the Govt seems to be that, in the lawful pursuit of proper
foreign policy and national security objectives, the Govt may have
in this case had an "incidental" effect on appellees' 1st amendmemt
rights, and that such "incidental" effect is permissable since it
is necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose sought to be
achieved.

-

The :e_osition of the Govt in this case is somewhat analo@ous

---

--

to its position in the "Pentagon Papers" case.

-------

In both cases 1st

amendment rights were at stake, although in this case those 1st

.,

,.

amendment rights are of a different
,, character. In both cases the
Govt argued that the Constitution conferred upon it powers and
responsibilities that must override any 1st amendment considerations.
In this case those constitutional powers and responsibilities are
denominated "foreign policy" and "national security~

This Court

has recognized that 1st amendment rights enjoy a preferred position
under our constitutional scheme, and that "any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity."
v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971).

-------------

New York Times Co.

The Govt refused to offer

-- -

any justification for the exclusion of Mandel in this case, thus

-

---...._---..

~

the Govt would appear to come up short should any "balancing"
test be applied, for the Govt has advanced nothing to put on its
side of the scales.
As noted above, relief in this case was limited to Mandel.
Presumably the Govt can in any future case challenging its
right to exclude aliens under the authority of the two subsections
of the statute involved in this case prevail upon ~showing of
the reasons for excluding the particular alien involved.

Since

the Govt handles these matters on a ·c ase-by-case basis, they
presumably have a reason for exclusion in cases where exclusion
is ordered.

The decision below leaves untouched the many sections

of the statute (literally dozens) which declare aliens ineligible
for visas
for a variety of specific reasons unrelated to publications and
beliefs.

I would therefore avoid this 1st amendment can of

worms at this time by joining Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and

7

Marshall in voting to AFFIRM.
CEP
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No. 71-16 MITCHELL v. MANDEL
Argued 4/18/72
Tentative Impressions*
This involves the refusal of the Attorney General to approve a
temporary visa for Prof. Mandel, a Belgian Marxist who had been
invited to speak at various American colleges.
The !migration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S. C. 1182(a)(28)(D)
and (G)(v)), provides in part that:
"The following classes of aliens s hall be ineligible to
receive visas and shall be excluded from admission
into the United States:
*****
"(D) Aliens . . . who advocate the economic .
doctrines of world Communism . . . "
Under this statute, Mandel was ineligible for a WJJ~ visa.

But

the statute allows the Attorney General, upon recommendation of the
Secretary of State, to authorize a temporary visa despite the normal
rule of the statute.
Mandel had been admitted to the country in 1962 and again in
1968. Although the Secretary of State recommended an exception this
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study and have discussion with the appropriate law clerk before the Conference. My
views are subject to change and to the discussion of the Conference.

:

,,

2.
time, the Attorney General denied the visa.

The only reason indicated

in the record (Exhibit Q, p. 68 of the Appendix) is a statement in a
letter from the Immigration Service stating that on his 1968 trip Mr.
Mandel was guilty of a "flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded him".
There is evidence in the record that Mandel's failure to comply with
conditions was inadvertent or unknowingly.
Suit was instituted by Mandel and various professors, avering
denial of First Amendment rights, asserting that the statute was
unconstitutional as applied to Mandel, and that in any event the action
of the AG was arbitrary and capricious.
A three-judge court sustained the complaint, and held that
plaintiffs were entitled to the injunction.

The court held that although

Mandel had no individual right to enter the country "the citizens of the
country (have the right under the First Amendment) to have the alien
enter and have him KXJ!liar explain and seek to defend his views." Thus,
a first amendment right was found to exist with respect to American
citizens who wished to hear the views of any alien.
Judge Bartels dissented, expressing the view that the policy
expressed in the statute (national security and foreign policy considerations) overrode any First Amendment interest citizens may have in
bringing aliens into the country.

.,

,.

3.
Position of Appellees in this Court:
As pointed out in the reply brief of the SG, and as borne out by
the oral argument, appellees no longer predicate their case in any
significant degree on the unconstitutionality of the statute.

The focus

of their attack has shifted to the alleged arbitrary and capricious
exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion to waive an alien's
inadmissibility.
This is quite a shift in position, certainly from that taken by
the district court - which held the statute unconstitutional as applied
to appellees.

If the statute, as so applied, is unconstitutional, the

Attorney General had no discretion to exercise.
Mr. Boudin admitted in oral argument that, under the statute,
some people could be excluded in the sound exercise of discretion.
He emphasized that the public interest in education - and free speech
on the campus - placed professors in a different and higher category
than other classes of mortals.

To use his term, Mr. Boudin argued

that there are'gradations" of interest in free speech, and that there is
a greater interest on the campus than elsewhere.
He also argued that the Attorney General could not have"unfettered
discretion". While Boudin was not clear, he apparently thinks the

4.
statute should provide standings, and perhaps a due process type
hearing, before the Attorney General can exercise his judgment. Mr.
Boudin ignored the fact that the broad policy of the statute is to exclude
persons like Mandel.

I must say that, to me, this policy is a stupid

one - certainly at this time. But it could hardly be an unconstitutional
•'

policy, unless this statute were discriminatorily applied.
Boudin' s argument would require the admission of Mandel
because invited by college professors, but would exclude an alien
invited say - by the Moose Lodge, or the Daughters of the Confederacy.
My Tentative View:
Although this case troubles me because I am not in sympathy

tl

with the statute, and also because the Attorney General exercise,,- in
my view - extraordinarily poor judgment I am still in doubt as to how
I shall vote.
It seems clear to me that Congress has the right to exclude

any and all aliens, so long as this is done on a nondiscriminatorial
basis.
It is also clear to me that a majority of the three-judge court

made an absurdly unsound judgment in holding that the First Amendment
gives the right to any American citizen to "hear" and "debate with"

5,

any foreigner whom he may wish to bring into the United States.

This

would make an utter shambles of the immigration laws.
This leaves me with onlythe argument - pressed by Boudin that the AG had a discretionary role and that he exercised it abitrarily
and capriciously. But here, on must remember that the statute
excluded all aliens in Mandel's class, and provided only for a limited
exception by the Attorney General. It is not clear to me how Congress
could prescribe any meaningful standards. Nor is it clear that any
type of "due process" hearing is necessary under the Constitution or
indeed would be feasible to adminster.
I will await the discussion.

.invrtnu <!}01ttt of tfyt 'J!ittitt~ j;tnftg
'D'allltin9fott, ~. <!}. 2ll&i'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THUR G OOD MARSHALL

May 3, 1972

Memorandum for the Chief Justice

·.
Re:

No. 71-16 - Mitchell v. Mandel

While I appreciate the assignment of this
opinion to me and have worked on it almost continuously
since that time, I sincerely regret that I find myself
unable to write it. As a matter of fact, I am convinced that my vote was in error.

It.
I

f:

,~,

.•.

You will remember that my vote was to agree
because "we had come too far to turn back." However,
my further research convinces me that I am not in
accord with The Chinese Exclusion Case and r: , not agree
that the Constitution gave to either Congress or the
Executive the broad power they assert.
As I said before Iam s
have to go down as a "backslider."

: ry, but I will

j1~

T.M.

cc:

The Conference
,,
•..

~omt of tltt ~1ttitdl ~tafrg
~11a$Iti1tnto11, p. <.q. 2 t\CiJt,~i

.§lt).lrtlttC

CHAMBERS OF"

.'

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 8, 1972
'

'

71-16, Kleindienst v. Mandel
Dear Harry,

...

I agree with your memorandum,
which I hope will become the opinion of the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

() <; '
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference

'/

,"

. .,m,

<IJoud., lift~ . . .

....Jpqtou. ,. QJ.

20~,

C H.AMl!SERS 9,-

.JU S Tl CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 12, 1972

Re:

No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Copies to the Conference

,.

6/13/72

CEP

1

I'

MEMORANDUM TO MR. JUSTICE POWELL
Rea

No. 71-16, Kleindienst (Mitchell) y. Mandel

This is the HOLD-FOR-NINE 1st amendment right to hear
case, involving the power of the Executive Branch to deny
visas to aliens seeking entry into this country for the
purpose of delivering lectures.
The USDC (2"to"l) held that US citizens had a fitst amendment right to hear Mandel, and held the statutes authorizing
the AG to deny admission to aliens because of their beliefs
BBZB

unconstitutional.
The Conference voted to reverse; you voted to reverse.

-

HAB has circulated an opinion for the Court, which PS

---------

and Rehnquist have joined.

WOD has circulated a dissent.

HAB recognizes the existence of a limited first amendment
right to hearp and he also recognizes the plenary power of
~

the XXlfttlO(YV)f Legislative Branch to formulate rules for the
exclusion of aliens,

He concludes the opinion by holdings

In summary, plenary congressional power to make
policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has
long been firmly established. In the case of
an alien excludable under 8212(a)(28), Congress
has delegated conditional exercise of this power
to the Executive. We hold that when the Executive
exercises this power negatively on the basis of
a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of
that discretion, nor test it by balancing its
justification against the First Amendment interests
of those who seek personal communication with the

-2-

,/

applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds
may be available for attacking exercise of discre"
tion for which no justification whatsoever is
advanced is a question we neither address nor
decide in this case,
WOD's dissent emphasizes that national security is not
involved, and that the majority's decision makes the AG a
censor of ideas,

The guts of WOD's opinion is1

Thought control is not within the 11:sairiBBB
competence of any branch of government, Those who
live here may need exposure to the ideas of people
of many faiths and many creeds to further their
education, We should construe the Act generously
by that First Amendment standard, saying that once
the State Department has concluded that our
foreign relations permit or require the admission
of a foreign traveller, the Attorney General is
left only with the IIBJIBXX problems of national
security, importation of heroin, or other like
matters within his competence,
WOD, in other words, has written on statutory rather than
constitutional grounds,
HAB 0 s opinion is very narrow.
narrow issue in this case,

It addresses only the

There are doubtless some on

the Court who would have preferred a broader opinion, giving
plenary exclusion power to the AG in all cases, irrespective
of whether the AG seeks to justify his exercise of the power.
That question is not presented by this case.
CEP

;

,.

71-16 Kleindienst v. Mandel

:

Mr. Justice Blackmun

cc: The Conference

,,

~up-rt1ttt

(!j:cnttt cf tl1 t 'Jttttitt~ ~tttf.tg

'JWag~foghttt, ~.

<!f.

ZOJiJtc'.)

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J. BRENNAN, JR.

.,;,

June 16, 1972

I,,/'

,•

RE: No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel
Dear Thurgood:

I

•.

•

''"r'

Please join me in your dissent in the
above.
)

,,

Mr. J us tic e Mar shall
cc: The Conference

.

··.···,f

..•
,,..·
..

~

,.

...

...
. .
,.
~~
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6/17/72

CEP

MEMORANDUM TO MR, JUSTICE POWELL
Rea

No, 71-16, Kleindienst (Mitchell) y, Mandel, DISSENT
of Justice Marshall

Justice Marshall has circulated a dissent, which
Justice Brennan has joined,

WOD has also circulated a

dissent, which I discussed in my memo on HAB's opinion for
the Court,

Marshall 0 s dissent strikes me as being very well written,
and it makes what seems to me to be the strongest case for
his position,

The dissent turns on what the First Amendment

requires in cases where the rights of American citizens are
at issue,
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.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

June 19, 1972

Re:

No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v.
Mandel

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to Conference
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THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

Re:

June 22, 1972

No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel

Dear Harry:
Please join me.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
,

THE C. J.

W. 0. D.

1~A-~>I

;

.

'I,..;,"

~(;

,1~-..f,-v

P. S.

W. J.B.

T. l\I.

B. R. W.

.

.

~

~

,JA~

~ /s/1,.;

,_ .

- ·....

~

,-11>'6

t./1,/-,v

,.

!iW../0
~

~

J'/J/rv,.J. .... _-J
...-- --

H. A. B.

S" I

L. F . P.

W. H. R.

'i /-, "'-

rl)l7f?;

~

,f1'/}r"'

"''"' ,_,..,,

~

J.J fJ I:>

,,,,,,,,,,

-

I

"

71-16 Acti.J Ilg Atty. Gen. v. Mandel

-

-

To: The Chief Justice
Mr.
Mr.
Mr .
Mr .
Mr .
Mr .
Mr.
1st DRAFT

Just i ce
Jus ti ce
Justi ce
J ustice
Ju stice
J usti ce
Justice

Douglas
Brennan
Stewart
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Marsbal1
Powell ~
Rehnquist

From: Blackrnun, J .

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED §fA?t~ed:_0,r+--,/,--Y-,fC.<----;'-?'---.2_
Recir culated:
No. 71- 16
Richard G. Kleindienst, Acting At- On Appeal from the
torney General of the United
United States District Court for the
States, et al., Appellants,
V.
Eastern District of
Ernest Mandel et al.
New York.
[June -, 1972]
MR. J USTICE BLACKMUN, Memorandum.
The appellees have framed the issue here as follows:
"Does appellants' action in refusing to allow an
alien scholar to enter the country to attend academic meetings violate the First Amendment rights
of American scholars and students who had invited
him?" I
Expressed in statutory terms, the question is whether
§§ 212 (a) (28) (D) and (G) (v) and § 212 (d) (3) (A) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat.
182- 185, 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182 (a)(28)(D) and (G)(v)
and § 1182 ( d) (3)(A), providing that certain aliens
"shall be ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded
from admission into the United States" unless the Attorney General, in his discretion, upon recommendation
by the Secretary of State or a consular officer, waives
inadmissibility and approves temporary admission , are
unconstitutional as applied here in that they deprive
American citizens of freedom of speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment.
1

Brief 1.

- - - - - --
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The challenged provisions of the statute are:
"Section 212 (a). Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, the following classes of aliens shall be
ineligible to receive visas and shall be excluded from
admission into the United States:
"(28) Aliens who arc, or at any time have been,
members of any of the following classes:
"(D) Aliens not within any of the other provisions of this paragraph who advocate the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of
world communism or the establishment in the
United Statrs of a totalitarian dictatorship ....
"(G) Aliens who write or publish . . . (v) the
economic, international, and govcrnme1ital doctrines
of ·world communism or the establishment in the
United States of a totalitarian dictatorship ...
"(cl) . . . .

"(3) Except as provided in this subsection, an
alien (A) who is applying for a nonimmigrant visa
and is known or believed by the consular officer to
be ineligible for such visa under one or more of the
paragraphs enumerated in subsection (a) ... may,
after approval by the Attorney General of a reeommendatioH by the Secretary of State or by the
consular officer that the alien be admitted temporarily despite his inadmissibility, be granted such
a visa and may be admitted into the United States
temporarily as a nonimmigrant in the discretion of
the Attorney General .... "
Section 212 (a) (6) provides that the Attorney General
"shall make a detailed report to the Congress in any
case in which he exercises his authority under paragraph
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( 3) of this subsection on behalf of any alien excludable
under paragraphs (9), (10). and (28)
"
T

Ernest E. Mandel resides in Brussels, Belgium, and
is a Belgian citizen. He is a professional journalist
and is editor-in-chief of the Belgian Left Socialist weekly
La Gauche. He is author of a two-volume work entitled "Marxist Economic Theory" published in 1969.
He asserted in his visa applications that he is not a
member of the Communist Party. He has described
himself, however. a.s "a revolutionary Marxist." 2 He
does not dispute, see 325 F. Supp., at 624, that he advocates the economic, governmental , and international
doctrines of world communism.a
Mandel was admitted to the United States temporarily in 1962 and again in 1968. On the first visit
he came as a working journalist. On the second he
accepted invitations to speak at a number of universities and colleges. On each occasion, although apparently he ,vas not then aware of it, his admission followed a finding of ineligibility under § 212 (a) (28), and
the Attorney General's exercise of discretion to admit
him temporarily, on recommendatio11 of the Secretary
of State, as § 212 (d)(3)(A) permits.
On Sptember 8, 1969, Mandel applied to the American Consul in Brussels for a nonimmigrant visa to
enter the United States in October for a six-clay period
during which he would participate in a. conference on
2
E. Mandel, ReYolutionary Strategy in the Imperialist Countries
(19G9), reprint rel in Apprndix 5.J-GG.
" fn their brief, appellcc:<, \l"hile ~up;gf'sti11g i11:1t § 101 (:1)(40), defining "world comrnnni:<m," and§ 212 (a) (28) (D) arc unacceptably
n1gue, "do not ronie~t ihc fact that appellnnts ran and do condude
that Dr. Mnndel's Marxist econornir philo ophy falls within the cope
of these vague provisions." Brief 10, n. 8.
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"Technology and the Third World" at Stanford University.1 He had been invited to Stanford by the Graduate Student Association there. The invitation stated
that John Kenneth Galbraith would present the keynote address and that Mandel would be expected to
participate in an ensuing panel discussion and to give a
major address the following day. The University,
through the office of its president, "heartily endorse [d]"
the invitation. When Mandel's intended visit became
known, additional invitations for lectures and conference participations came to him from members of the
faculties at Princeton, Amherst, Columbia, and Vassar,
from groups in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and New
York City, and from others. One conference was to
be in New York City sponsored jointly by the Bertrand
Russell Peace Foundation and the Socialist Scholars
Conference; Mandel's assigned subject there was "Revolutionary Strategy in Imperialist Countries." Mandel
then filed a second visa application proposing a more
extensive itinerary and a stay of greater duration.
On October 23, the Consul at Brussels informed
Mandel orally that his application of September 8 had
been refused. This was confirmed in writing on October 30. The Consul's letter advised him of the finding
of inadmissibility under § 212 (a) (28) in 1962, the
waivers in that year and in 1968, and the current denial
of a waiver. It said, however, that another request
for waiver was being forwarded to Washington in connection with Mandel's second application for a visa.
4
Entry presumably was claimed as a nonimmigrant alien under
§ 101 (a) (15) (H) (i) of the Ac1, 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (n) (15) (Jf)(i),
namely, "an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning ... who i of di~tinguishrd mrrit and
ability and who i~ coming temporarily to the United States 1o perform services of an exceptional nature requiring such mrrit and
ability . . . ."

, ..

'·
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The Department of State, through its Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs and by a letter dated November 6 to Mandel's New York attorney, asserted that
the earlier waivers had been granted on condition that
Mandel conform to his itinerary and limit his activities
to the stated purposes of his trip, but that on his 1968
visit he had engaged in activities beyond the stated
purposes. For this reas011, it was said, a waiver "was
not sought in connection with his September visa application." The Department went on to say, however,
that it had now learned that Mandel might not have
been aware i11. 1968 of the conditions and limitations
attached to his visa issuance, and that, in view of this
and upon his assurances tha,t he would conform to his
stated itinerary and purposes, the Department was reconsidering his case. On December 1 the Consul at
Brussels informed Mandel that his visa had been refused.
The Department of State in fact had recommended
to the Attorney General that Mandel's ineligibility be
waived with respect to his October visa application.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service, however,
acting on behalf of the Attorney General, see 28 U. S. C.
§ 510, in a letter dated February 13, 1970, to New York
counsel stated that it had determined that Mandel'i'.l
1968 activities while in the United States "went far
beyond the stated purposes of his trip, on the basis of
which his admission had been authorized and represented a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded
him to express his views in this country." The letter
concluded that favorable exercise of discretion, provided
for under the Act, was not warranted and that Mandel's
temporary admission was not authorized.
Mandel's address to the New York meeting was thf'n
delivered by transatlantic telephone.
In March Mandel and six of the other appellees instituted the present action against the Attorney Gen-

71-16-0PINIO~
(l

1(LEI1\D1ENST v. MANDEL

eral and the Secretary ot State. The two rcmarnrng
appcllccs soon came into the lawsuit by an amendment
to the complaint. All the appellces who joined Mandel
in this action are United States citizens and are university professors in various fields of the social sciences.
They arc persons who in vitcd Ma.ndel to speak at universities and other forums in the United States or who
expected to participate in colloqu~,.ifh him so that,
as the complaint alleged, "they may hear his views
and engage him in a free and open academic exchange."
The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes in question are
unconstitutional on their face and as applied and that
their application to Mandel was arbitrary and unreasonable. The American plaintiffs urged that Mandel's exclusion violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights
and that §§ 212 (a) (28) and ( d)(3) (A) arc void on
their face and as applied in that they were denied both
equal protection and due process. Declaratory and injunctive relief wa.s sought.
A three-judge district court ,vas duly convened. The
case was tried on the pleadings and affidavits " ·ith exhibits. T,,·o judges held that, although Mandel had
no personal right to enter the U11it€d States, citizens
of this country have a First Amendment right to have
him enter and to hear him explain and seek to defend
his views. The court then entered a declaratory judgment that § 212 (a) (28) and § 212 ( d)(3) (A) were invalid and void insofar as they had been or might be
invoked by the defendants to find Mandel ineligible for
admission. The defendants ,vere enjoined from implementing and enforcing those statutes so as to deny
Mandel admissions as a nonimrnigrant visitor. Judge
Bartels dissented. 325 F. Supp. 620 (EDNY 1971).
Probable jurisdiction " ·as noted. 404 U. S. 1013 ( 1972).
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II
Until 1875 alien migration to tho United States was
unrestricted. The Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477.
barred convicts and prostitutes. SeveJJ years later Congress passed the first general immigration statute. Act
of August 3. 1882, 22 Stat. 214. Other legislation followed. A general revision of the immigration laws was
effected by tho Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1213- 1222.
Section 2 of that Act made ineligible for admission
"anarchists, or persons who believe in or advocate the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of
the United States or of all government or of all forms
of law." By the Act of October 16, 1918, 40 Stat. 1012,
Congress expanded tho provisions for the exclusion of
subversive aliens. Title II of the Alien Registration
Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 670, 671, amended the 1918 Act
to bar aliens "·ho, at any time, had advocated or
wore members of or affiliated with organizations that
advocated violent overthro,v of the United States
Government.
In the years that followed. after extensive investigation and numerous reports by congressional committees,
see Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control
Board, 367 U. S. 1, 94, u. 37 (1961) , Congress passed
the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 987. This
Act disp<'nsod with tho requirement of the 1940 Act of
a finding in each case, ,rith respect to members of the
Communist Party , that the party did in fact advocate
violent overthrow of the Government. These provisions
were carried forward into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.
We thus have almost continuous attention on the
part of Congress since 1875 to the problems of immigration and of excludability of certain defined classes

71-16-0PINION
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of aliens. The pattern generally has been one of increasing control with particular attention, for almost
70 years now, first to anarchists and then to those with
communist affiliation or views.

III
It is clear that Mandel personally, as an unaclmitted
and nonresident alien, had no constitutional right of
entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise.
United Sta.tes ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279,
292 (1904); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950); Galvan v. Kress, 347 U. S.
522, 530-532 (1954); see Harisia.des v. Shaughnessy,
342 U. S. 580, 592 (1952).
The appellees concede this. Brief, at 33, Tr. of Oral
Arg. 28. Indeed, the American appellees assert that
"they sue to enforce their rights, individually and as
members of the American public, and assert none on
the part of the invited alien." Brief, at 14. "Dr. Mandel
is in a sense made a plaintiff because he is symbolic of
the problem," Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.
The case, therefore, comes down to the narrow issue
whether the First Amendment confers upon the appellee
professors, because they wish to hear, speak, and debate
with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that
Mandel should be permitted to enter the country or,
in other·words, to compel the Attorney General to allow
Mandel's admission.

IV
In a variety of contexts this Court has held that the
First Amendment protects the right to "receive information and ideas," the freedom to hear as well as the
freedom to speak.
"It is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas.

'·
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'This freedom [of speech and press] ... necessarily
protects the right to receive ... .' Martin v. City
of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) .... " Stanley Y. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969).
This was one basis for the decision in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). The Court there held that
a labor organizer's right to speak and the rights of
workers "to hear what he had to say," id., at 534, were
both abridged by a state law requiring organizers to
register before soliciting union membership. In a very
different situation, Mn. JUSTICE WHITE, speaking for
a unanimous Court upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine" in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S.
367, 386-390 (1969), said:
"It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which
truth will ultimately prevail . . . . It is the right
of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right may
not be constitutionally abridged either by Congress
or by the FCC." Id., at 390.
And in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301
( 1965), the Court held that a statute permitting the
Government to hold "communist political propaganda"
arriving in the mails from abroad unless the addre~sce
affirmatively requested in writing that it be delivered
to him placed an "unjustifiable burden" on the addressee's
First Amendment rights. MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring and joined by two other Justices, stated, "I
think the right to receive publications is ... a fundamental right." Id., at 308. This Court has recognized
that this right is "nowhere more vital" than in our
schools a.nd universities. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S.
479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. New Ha,npshire, 354 U. S..

71-lG-OPINION
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234, 250 ( 1957) ( opinion of Chief Justice Warren);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967).
See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S. 97 ( 1968).
In the present case, the District Court majority held:
"The concern of the First Amendment is not with
a non-resident alien's individual and personal interest in entering and being heanl, but with the
rights of the citizens of the country to have the
alien enter and to hear him explain and seek to
defend his views; that, as Garrison [v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 64 (1964) J, and Red Lion observe, is of
the essence of self-government." 325 F. Supp., at
631.
The Government disputes this conclusion on two grounds.
First, it argues that exclusion of Mandel involves no
restriction on First Amendment rights at all since what
is restricted is "only action-the action of the alien
coming into this country." Brief, at 29. Principal
reliance is placed on Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965),
where the Government's refusal to validate an American
passport for travel to Cuba was upheld. The rights
asserted there were those of the passport applicant himself. The Court held that his right to travel and his
asserted ancillary right to inform himself about Cuba
did not outweigh substantial "foreign policy considerations affecting all citizens" that, with the backdrop
of the Cuban missile crisis, were characterized as the
"weightiest considerations of national security." Id.,
at 13, 16. The rights asserted here, in some contrast,
are those of American academics who have invited Mandel to participate with them in colloquia, debates, and
discussion in the United States. In light of the Court's
previous decisions concerni11g the "right to receive information," we cannot realistically say that the problem
faci11g us disappears entirely or is nonexistent because
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the mode of regulatiot bears directly on physical movement. In Thomas the registration r('quirernent on its
face concerned only action. In Lamont too, the face
of the regulation dealt only with the Government's undisputed po\\"er to control physical entry of mail into
the country. See United Slates v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258,
263 ( 1067).
The Government also suggests that the First Amendment is inapplicable because appellees have free access
to Mandel's ideas through his books and speeches, and
because "technological developments," such as tapes or
telephone hook-ups, readily supplant his physical presence. This argument overlooks what may be particular
qualities inherent in sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning. While alternative means of
access to Mandel's ideas might be a relevant factor were
we called upon to balance First Amendment rights against
governmental regulatory interests-a balance we find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in
Part V-wo are loath to hold on this record that existence
of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional intere::;t on the part of the appellees in this
particular form of access.
V
Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositivo of our inquiry here.
In accord with ancient principles of tho international law
of nation-states, the Court in The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889), and in Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), held broadly, as the
Government describes it, Brief, at 20, that the power
to exclude aliens is "inherent in sovereignty, necessary for
maintaining normal international relations and defending the country against foreign encroachments and
dangers-a power to be exercised exclusively by the political branches of government .... " Since that time,

-~
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the Court's geueral reaffirmations of this prinicple have
been legion. 5 The Court without exception has sustained
Congress' "plenary power to make rules for the admission
of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden." Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123
(1967). "[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over" the
admission of aliens. Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 339 (1909). In Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U. S. 538, 547 (1895), the first Mr.
Justice Harlan said,
"The power of Congress to exclude aliens altogether from the United States, or to prescribe the
terms and conditions upon which they may come to
this country, and to have its declared policy in that
regard enforced exclusively through executive officers,
without judicial intervention, is settled by our previous adjudications."
Mr. Justice Frankfurter ably articulated this history in
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522 (1954), a deportation
case, and we can do no better. After suggesting, at 530,
that "much could be said for the view" that due process
places some limitations on congresssional power in this
area "were we writing on a clean slate," he continued:
"But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of
the power of Congress under review, there is not
merely a 'page of history' ... but a whole volume.
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their
right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with
6 See, for example, El,;iu v. Unit ed States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892);
Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U. S. 296, 302 (1902); United
States ex rel. Turner v. Wiliiams, 194 U. S. 279, 294 (1904); Keller
v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 143-144 (1909); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U.S. 32, 40 (1924); Shaughnessy v. M ezei, 345 U, S. 206,210 (1953);
cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,377 (1!)71).

'.

,

;
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the political conduct of government. In the enforcement of these policies, the Executive Branch of the
Government must respect the procedural safeguards
of due process. . . . But that the formulation of
these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has
become about as firmly embedded in the legislative
and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect
of our government. . . .
"We are not prepared to deem ourselves wiser or
more sensitve to human rights than our predecessors,
especially those who have been most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Constitution, and
must therefore under our constitutional system recognize congressional power in dealing with aliens .... "
Id., at 531-532.
We are not inclined in the present context to reconsider
this line of cases. Indeed, the appellees, in contrast to
the amicus, do not ask that we do so. The appellees
recognize the force of these many precedents. In seeking
to sustain the decision below, they concede that Congress
could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all
aliens falling into the class defined by § 212 (a) (28) (D)
and (G)(v), and that First Amendment rights could not
override that decision. Brief, at 16. But they contend
that by providing a waiver procedure, Congress clearly
intended that persons ineligible under the broad provision of the section would be temporarily admitted when
appropriate "for humane reasons and for reasons of public interest." S. Rep. No. 1137, Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 12 (1952). They argue that
the Executive's implementation of this congressional
mandate through decision whether to grant a waiver in
each individual case must be limited by the First Amendment rights of persons like appellees. Specifically, their
position is that the First Amendment rights must prevail
at least where the Government advances no justification

71-16-0PINION
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whasoever for failing to grant a waiver. They point to
the fact that waivers have been granted in the vast majority of cases."
Appellees' First ;\mendment argument would prove
too much. In almost every instance of an alien excludable under § 212 (a) (28), there are probably those who
would wish to meet and speak with him. The ideas of
most such aliens might not be so influential as those of
Mandel, nor his American audience so numerous, nor the
planned discussion forums so impressive. But the First
Amendment does not protect only the articulate, the well
known, and the popular. ·w ere we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to withhold a waiver must
yield whenever a bona fide claim is made that American
citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable
under § 212 (a)(28), one of two unsatisfactory results
would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority
Congress granted the Executive becomes a nullity, or
courts in each case would be required to weigh the

,.
),

The Government 's brief states :
"The Immigration and Naturalization SerYice reports the following
with respect to applications to the Attorney General for waiver of
an alien's ineligibiltiy for admission under Section 212 (a) (28):
Total Number of
Numlwr
Number
Applications for
of
of
Waiver of
Waiver~
Waivers
Year
Section 212 (a) (28)
Granted
Denied
1971
14
6210
6196
1970
6193
6189
4
1969
4993
4984
9
1968
4184
417G
8
1967
3 60
3852
8
Brief 18, n. 24. Thei:;e ra ~e::;, however, arc only those that, :rn § 212
(cl) (3) (A) provides, come to the Attornc)· General wit h a po~itiYe
recommendation from the Secretary of State or the consular officer.
The figures do not include those cases where either of these offi cials
had refrained from making a positive recommendation .
6
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strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet undetermined standard.
The dangers a11d the undesirability of making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of the
audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious.
Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the
Executive.
Appellees seek to soften the impact of this analysis by
arguing that the First Amendment claim should prevail
at least where the Executive advances no justification at
all for denial of a waiver. Brief 26. The Government
would have us reach this question, urging a broad decision that Congress has delegated the waiver decision to
the Executive in its sole and unfettered discretion , and
any reason or no reason may be given. See Jay v. Boyd,
351 U. S. 345, 357- 358 (1956); Hintopoulos v. Shaughnessy, 353 U. S. 72, 77 (1957); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363
U. S. 405. 408 (1960). This record, however, does not
require that we do so, for the Attorney General did inform
Mandel's counsel of the reason for refusing him a waiver.
And that reason was facially legitimate and bona fide.
The Government has chosen not to rely on the letter
to counsel either in the District Court or here. The fact
remains, however, that the official empowered to make
the decision stated that he denied a waiver because he
concluded that previous abuses by Mandel that were
contrary to the Government's interests made it inappropriate to grant a waiver again. With this, we think
the Attorney General validly exercised the plenary power
which Congress delegated to the Executive by § 212 (a)
(28) and (d)(3).
In summary, plenary congressional power to make
policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been
firmly established. In the case of an alien excludable
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under § 212 (a) (28), Congress has delegated conditional
exercise of this power to the Executive. We hold that
when the Executive exercises this power negatively on
the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the
courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against
the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal
communication with the applicant. What First Amendment or other grounds may be available for attacking
exercise of discretion for which no justification whatsoever is advanced is a question we neither address nor
decide in this case.
Reversed.
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No. 71-16 - Kleindienst v. Mandel
Mr. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissenting.
Dr. Ernest Mandel, a citizen of Belgium, is an
Recirculated:
internationally famous Marxist scholar and journalist.

------He

was invited to our country by a group of American scholars
who wished to meet him for discussion and debate.

With firm

plans for conferences, colloquia, and lectures, · the American
hosts were stunned to learn that Mandel had been refused permission to enter our country.

American consular officials had

found Mandel "ineligible" to receive a visa under §212 (a) (28)
lQf th ~J_mrn i r a ti 0n Ac t;.-.J.J
(D) and (G) (v) which bars even temporary visits to the United
States by aliens who "advocate the economic, international and
governmental doctrines of wor ld communism" or "who write or
publish any written or printed matter*** advocating or
teaching * * * 11 such doctrines.

Under §212 (d) (3), the Attorney
:

General refused to waive ineligibility.

,.

I, too, am stunned to learn that a country with our
proud heritage has refused Dr. Mandel temporary admission.

I

am convinced that Americans cannot be c1.e nied the opportunity
to hear Dr. Mandel's views in person because their government
disapproves of Dr. Mandel's ideas, and, therefore, I dissent.
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As the majority correctly observes,

"In a variety of

contexts this Court has held that the First Amendment protects

.

the right to 'receive information and ideas,' the freedom to
hear as well as the freedom to speak. "

'

The reason for this is

that the First Amendment protects a process - in Justice
Brandeis' words,

.

"reason as applied through public discussion,"

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)

(concurring

opinion) - and the right to speak and hear are inextricably
part of that process.

The freedom to speak and the freedom

to hear are inseparable; they are two sides of the same coin.
But the coin itself is the process of thought and discussion.
The activity of speakers becoming listeners and listeners becoming speakers in the vital interchange of thought is the
"means indispensible to the discovery and spread of political
truth."

Id.; see Terrniniello v. Chic~o, 337 U.S. l, 4

(1949).

Its protection is "a fundamental principle of the Ame rican
government."

Whitney v. California, _§_Upr~ at 375.

The First

.
J

,.

j

Amendment means that government has no power to thwart the
process of free discussion,

to "abridge" the freedoms necessary

to make that process work.

See Lamont v. Po~tmaster General,

381 U.S. 301,

308

(1965)

(Br •: nnan, J., concurr-'n g, with whom

1
I

!I

Goldberg, J., andHarl ;:,.:1 , J.,

joined).
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There can be no doubt that by denying the American
appellees access to Dr. Mandel, governme nt has directly

11
prevented the £ree interchang·e of ideas.

It has, of course,

interfered with appellees' personal rights both to hear
Mandel's views and to develop and articulate their own views
through interaction with Mandel.

But as the court below

recognized, apart from appellees' interests, there is also
a "general public interest in the prevention of any stifling
of political utterance."

325 F.Supp. 620, 632

And

(1971).

2:./
government has interfered with this as well.
II
What is the justification for this extraordinary governmental interference with the liberty of American citizen s ?
\

7

And

I,

,.

.,

by what reasoning does the Court uphold Mandel's e xclusion?
It is established constitutional doctrine, after all, that
government may restrict First Amendme nt rights only if the

----

l-- ~

,.

'I ' ,

·-~

restriction is necessary to furth e r a compelling governme ntal>1'~
interest.

-

~'

E.g., Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra at 308;,-.....

,1-,o

N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Gibson v. F J ~
Legislative Conunittee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); Shelton v . ~

~

Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (196U).
A.

Today's majority apparently holds that Mandel may

be excluded and Americans' First Amendme nt rights abridged
because the Attorney General has given a "facially legitimate
and bona fide" reason for refusing to waive Mandel's visa

I

I..
I
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ineligibility.
standard.

I do not understand the source of the queer

Merely "legitimate" governmental interests cannot

override Constitutional rights.

Moreover, the majority demands

only "facial" legitimacy and good faith, by which it means that
this Court will never "look behind" any reason the Attorney
General gives.

No citation is given for this kind of un-

precedented deference to the Executive, nor can I imagine

l/
(nor am I told) the slightest justification for such a rule.
Even the briefest peek behind the Attorney General's
reason for refusing a waiver in this case would show that it
is a sham.

The Attorney General informed appellees' counsel

that the waiver was refused because Mandl' l's activities on a
previous American visit "went far beyond the stated purposes
of his trip

* * *

and represented a flagrant abuse of the

opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country

* * *."

App. 68.

But, as the Department of State had already

conceded to appellees' counsel, Dr. Mandel "was apparently
not informed that [his previous] visa was issued only after
obtaining a waiver of ineligibility and therefore [he] may not
have been aware of the conditions and limitations attached to
the [previous] visa issuance."

App. 22.

There is no basis in

the present record for concluding tliat Mandel's behavior on
his previous visit was a "flagrant abuse" - or even wilful or
knowing departure - from visa restrictions.

For good reason,

\ ' ' ' ·'

'

'·
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r(.··

the Government in this litigation has never relied on the
Attorney General's reason to justify Mandel's exclusion.

..

In

,

····-'

these circumstances, the Attorney General's reason cannot
possibly support a decision for the Government in this case.
But without even remanding for a factual hearing to see if
there is any support for the Attorney General's determination,
,,

the majority declares that his reason is sufficient to override

'•}

appellees' First Amendment interests.
B.

,.'
.,~

Even if the Attorney General had given a sufficiently

compelling reason for declining to grant a waiver under Section
212 (d) (3) (A),

this would not, for me, end the case.

As I

understand the statutory scheme, Mandel is "ineligible" for a

I

visa, and therefore "inadmissible," solely because, under
Section 212

(a) (28), he has adm cated communist doctrine and

has published writings advocating that doctrine.

The waiver

'.
,.

,:

question under Section 212(d) (3) (A) is totally secondary and
dependent, since it may be triggered only by a determination of
(a) (28)

"inadmissibility."

The h ttorney General's refusal to

waive "inadmissibility" does not itself generate a new statutory
basis for inadmissibility; the Attorney General has no roving
power to set new ad hoc standards for visa ineligibility.
Rather, the Attorney General's refusal to waive inadmissibility
simply has the same effect as if no waiver provision existed;
"inadmissibility" still rests on the (a) (28) determination.

~

.
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Thus, even if the Attorney General has a good reason for
refusing a waiver, this Court,

I think, must still face the

question it tries to avoid: under our Constitution, may Mandel
be declared inadmissible under (a) (28)?
C.

In any event, since it is clear to me that the

Attorney General's asserted reason is insufficient to exclude
Mandel, I turn to the sole justification urged by the Govern-

·+

ment here or below - that ti\-e~lv:~rament has the power to exclude Mandel in this case because he "advocates" and "publishes

* * *

printed matter

communism."

* *

Section 212

*advocating*** doctrines of world
(a) (28).

I

Still adhering to standard First Amendment doctrine, I

1
'

l
i

do not see how (a) (28) can possibly represent a compelling
governmental interest to override appellees' interests in hearing

-

Mandel.

Unlike (a) (27) or (a) (29),

(a) (28) does not claim to

exclude aliens who repres e·.;. t an active and present threat to

national security.

Rather,

,,

(a) (28) excludes aliens solely

because they have advocated communist doctrine.

Our cases

make clear, however, that government has no legitimate interest
in stopping the flow of ideas.

It has no power to res tr ic t the

mere advocacy of communist doctrine, divorced from incitement
to imminent lawless action.
297-98

Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,

(1961); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).

';,,
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The First Amendment represents the view of the Framers that
" [ t] he pa th of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss
...., ..,.

freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that

...

the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones," "more

,...::

speech."

Whitne_y v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 377 (1927)

(Brandeis, J., concurring).

.·,.

Where Americans want to hear about
.,

I

Marxist doctrine, even from advocates, government cannot prevent
them simply because it does not approve of the ideas.

It cer-

tainly may not selectively pick and choose which ideas it will
let into the country.
(1972).

Cf. Police Department v. Mosley,

U.S.

But, as the court below put it, Section 212 (a) (28)

is nothing more than "a means of restraining the entry of disfavored
political doctrine," 325 F.Supr. 620, 626

(1971), and such an

enactment cannot justify the abridgment of appellees' First
Amendment rights.
In saying these things,

I am merely repeating established

;

~

.,. '
First Amendment law.

Indeed, this Court has already applied that

law in a case concerning the entry of communist doctrine from
foreign lands.
(1965),

In Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301

this Court held that the right of an American addressee

to receive communist political propaganda from abroad could not
be fettered by requiring the addressee to request in writing its
delivery from the Post Offjce.

See, id. at 308 (Brennan, J.,
..,'

concurring).

The burden imposed on the right to receive

8

information in our case is far greater than in Lamont, with
far less justification.

In Lamont,

'·

the challenged law merely

regulated the flow of mail, and required the Postmaster Ge neral
to forward detained mail immediately upon request by the
addressee.

By contrast,

through Section 212(a) (28), the

Government claims absolute power to bar Mandel permanently
from academic meetings in this country.

Moreove r, in Lamont,

the government argued that its interest was not to censor
content but rather to protect Americans from receiving unwanted
mail.

Here, Mandel's exclusion is not incident to a legitimate

regulatory objective, but is based directly on the subject
matter of his beliefs .
D.

The heart of the Government's position in this case,

and the basis for its distinguishing Lamont, is that its power is
distinctively broad and unreviewable becaui:ie "the re ~r ulation
in question is directed at the admission of aliens."
p. 33.

Brief,

Thus, in the Government's view, this case is no different

from a long line of cases holding that the power to exclude aliens

<

is left exclusively to the "political" branches of government,
Congress and the Executive.
These cases are not the strongest precedents in the
U.S. Reports, and the majority's baroque approach reveals its
!

reluctance to rely on them completely.

They include such

milestones as The Chines9 Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889),

I'

I
t

I
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,,..'

and Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 691' (1893), in

',

which this Court held that the right to expel Chinese aliens
from our midst is "inherent in sovereignty."

,

...
.
,,
::

'

.r f·

But none of these old cases must be "reconsidered" or
overrule~ to strike down Dr. Mandel's exclusion, for none of
them was concerned with the rights of American citizens.
least where the rights of Americans are involved,
basis for concluding that the power

1

At

there is no

·t::

.......
·',
~·
,.'·,

o exclude aliens is absolute.

"When Congress' exercise of its enumerated powers clashes with
those individual liberties protected by the Bill of Rights,

..

, '·

•"\·

it is our 'delicate and difficult task' to determine whether
the resulting restriction on freedom can be tolerated."
United States, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1 96 7).

Robel v.

As Rob el and other

cases described in footnote 5 show, all governmenta l ~ower-even the war power,

the power to maintain national security,

and the power to conduct foreign affairs--is limited by the
Bill of Rights.

.v When

individual freedoms are at stake, we do

lt):L~.J

not blindly defer to broad claims ofJ Legislative or Executive,

powm;;., but rather we consider these claims i r light of the
individual freedoms.

This should be our approach in the p resent

case, even though the Government urges that the question of
admitting aliens may involve foreign relations and national
defense policies.

;"

......

.
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The majority recognizes that the right of American
citizens to hear Mandel is "implicated" in our case.

There

were no rights of Americans involved in a.ny of the old alien

,I..

exclusion cases, and therefore their broad counsel about
deference to the political branches is inapplicable.

Surely

a Court which can distinguish between pre-indictment and postindictment lineups, Kirby v. Illinois,

u. s.

(1972) , can

distinguish between our case and cases which involve only the

.

rights of aliens.

'

I do not mean to suggest that simply because a group of
Americans wish to hear an alien speak, they can automatically
compel even his temporary admission to our country.

Go\ ornment

can prohibit aliens from even temporary admission if exclusion
is necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest.

21

Actual threats to the national security, public health need r-: ,
and genuine requirements of law enforcement are the most
apparent interests which would surely be compelling.

But in

Dr. Mandel's case, the Government has, and claims, no such
compelling interest.

We are concerned here only with

·
·
to th e coun t ry
a drn issiom

by quotas.
§2.6 (1971).

by

11

temporary

•
•
t 5,n a c 1 ass not covere d
nonirnrnigran

Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure
Mandel's "ineligibility" for a visa is based

solely on Section 212 (a) (28).

The only governmental interest

11

embodied in that section iu that the government wants to keep
certain ideas out of circulation in this country.
hardly a compelling governmental interest.

This is

Section (a) (28)

may not be the basis for excluding an alien where Americans
wish to hear him.

Without any claim that Mandel "live" is an

actual threat to this country, there is no difference between
excluding Mandel because of his ideas and keeping his books out
because of its ideas.

Neither is permitted.

Lamont v. Post'"'i.·,

'I

master General, supra.
III
Dr. Mandel has written about his exclusion, concluding
that " [ i] t demonstrates a lack of confidence" on the part of
our government "in the capacity of its supporters to combat
Marxism on the battleground of ideas."

He observes that he

"would not be carrying any high explosives, if I had come, but
only, as I did before, my revolutionary views which are well
known to the public."

..

•,,

And he wryly notes that "In the nine-

teenth century the British ruling class, which was sure of
itself, permitted Karl Marx to live as an exile in England
for about forty years."

Appendix 54.

The government does not dispute that Dr. Mandel's brief
trip would involve nothing but a series of scholarly conferences
and lectur es.

•ro follow the path of the Government in this

case departs from the basic traditions of our country, its

•'.
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fearless acceptance of free discussion.

r;y deferring to the

Executive, this Court departs from its own best role as the
guardian of individual liberty in the face of governmental
overreaching.

Principles of judicial restraint designed to

allow the policial branches to protect national security have
no place in this dispute.
his brief visit.
I dissent.

Dr. Mandel should be admitted for

FOOTNOTES
1. Twenty years a go, tb ::, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
devoted an entire issue to the problem of American visa policy
and its effect on the interchange of ideas between American
scholars and scientists and their foreign counterparts.
The
general conclusion of the Editors - supported by printed
statements of such men as Albert Einstein, Hans Bethe, Harold
Urey, Arthur Compton, Michael Polyani, Raymond Aron, and J.
Coulomb - was that American visa policy was injurious to the
development of American science and American intellectual
development, and harmful to our prestige abroad.
Volume VIII,
No. 7, October 1952, pp. 210-17 (statement of Special Editor
Edward Shils).
The detrimental effect of American visa pol.icy
on the free exchange of ideas continues to be reported.
See
Note, Opening the Floodgates to Dissident Aliens, 6 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 141, 143-49 (1970); Bull, of the
Atomic Scientists, Vol. XI, December 1955, pp. 367-73.
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2.
The availability to appellees of Mandel's books and taped
lectures is no substitute for live, face to face debate, just
as the availability to us of briefs and exhibits does not
supplant the essential place of oral argument in this Court's
work.
3. Compare Frankel, Bench Warrants Upon the Prosecutor's
Demand, 71 Col. L. Rev 403, 414 (1971).
(The writer is the
distinguished United States District Judge.)
4.
The majority suggests that appellees "concede that Congress
could enact a blanket prohibition against entry of all aliens
falling into the class defined by §212(a) (28) (D) and G(v) and
that First Amendment rights could not override that decision."
This was certainly not the view of the court below, whose
judgmcn t the Gov~nm..§_!2 t alone has challenged here and appellees
have moved to affirm.
It is true that app e llees have argued to
this Court a ground of decision in alternative to that argued
and adopted below; but they have hardly conceded the incorrectness of what they successfully ar9uc d below.
They have
simply noted at p. 16 of their Brief that even if this Co urt
rejects the broad decision below, there would neverthele s s be a
separate and narrower basis for affirmance.
See Tr. of Oral
Arg. 24, 25-26, 41-42.

'••,

'

t.
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5.
In Robel, this Court struck down a statute making it a
criminal offense for any employee of a "defense facility" to
remain a member of the Communist Party, in spite of Government
claims that the enactment came within the "war power." In
Aptheker v. Secr~t~.£.Y._Qf State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), the Government unsuccessfully sought to defend the denial of passports
to American members of the Communist Party, in spite of claimed
threats to the national security.
In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965), the passport restriction on travel to Cuba was upheld,
but the Court rejected any assumption "that simply because a
statute deals with foreign relations, it can grant the executive
totally unrestricted freedom of choice." Id at 17.
In
Schneider v. Ru~k, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), the Government unsuccessfully attempted to justify a statutory inequality
between naturalized and native-born citizens under the foreign
relations power. And in Lamont itself, as Justice Brennan noted,
the Government urged that the statute was "justified by the
object of avoiding· the subsidization of propaganda of foreign
governments which bar American propaganda;" Justice Brennan
answered that Government must act "by means and on terms which
do not endanger First Amendment rights." Id at 310.

·'

,,

6.
I agree with the majority that courts should not inquire
into such things as the "probity of the speaker's ideas."
Neither should t.11. Executive, however. Where Americans wish
to hear an alien, and their claim is not a demonstrated sham,
the crucial question is whether the QQyernment's interest in
excluding the alien is compelling.
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